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Non-technical Summary 
 
The role of the finance minister differs in various aspects from that of the remaining cabinet 
members. His main task is to enforce overall budgetary objectives. Depending on the 
organization of the budget process, the finance minister’s functions range from monitoring 
and enforcing negotiated budgetary objectives to setting the fiscal agenda for the upcoming 
years. Apart from his original budget task, the finance minister is not primarily responsible for 
specific spending projects. This dissolves his incentives to exploit pork barrel projects. Quite 
the contrary, the finance minister’s institutional function in the cabinet is to resist the 
emerging spending pressures of his colleagues. The finance minister is thus the cabinet 
member who has the strongest interest in sound public finance and has a comprehensive view 
of the budget.  
However, while there is a growing literature on the impact of personal characteristics of 
decision makers on policy decisions in various fields in economics, investigations concerning 
fiscal policy are still scarce and mostly refer to the personal characteristics of the prime 
minister. This paper’s innovations are thus threefold: To the best of my knowledge, it is the 
first description of personal characteristics of national finance ministers in Europe for the 
period 1980 – 2010. Second, it extends the literature on the determinants of public debt by 
the, so far, largely neglected impact factors of one of the most relevant decision makers, and 
third, it is the first investigation which combines personal characteristics of finance ministers 
with those of their prime ministers. 
To answer the question whether personal characteristics of finance ministers affect the 
development of public debt, I use a unique dataset of personal characteristics of European 
national finance ministers and their respective prime ministers for the period 1980 – 2010. In 
a nutshell, the results reveal that especially a finance minister’s experience gained in office 
and his political experience have an impact on the development of public debt: The change of 
the debt to GDP ratio is negative the more experience a finance minister has gained as a 
minister of finance or in former positions as a national cabinet member. While the former 
result suffers from potential endogeneity, several arguments support that the latter result can 
be interpreted in a causal way. In contrast, a finance minister’s educational background or 
ideology have no significant impact on public debt changes.  
The results are in line with the theory. The institutional function of the finance minister is to 
resist spending pressures of his cabinet colleagues. It is thus reasonable to assume that those 
ministers who have a sound understanding of the ways of political decision making have 
comparative advantages as compared to relatively inexperienced finance ministers. A finance 
minister who was a national cabinet member before becoming minister of finance has shown 
his ability to survive in politics. This demonstrates decisiveness and self-assertion which then 
also reflects in his new position as minister of finance. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Innerhalb der Regierung nimmt der Finanzminister eine besondere Position ein. Während 
seine Kabinettskollegen für bestimmte fachliche Politikbereiche verantwortlich sind, besteht 
seine Hauptaufgabe in der Aufstellung und Durchsetzung des jährlichen Gesamthaushalts. Je 
nach Ausgestaltung des Budgetprozesses reicht seine Kompetenz dabei von der Kontrolle der 
Ist-Zahlen bis zur strategischen Planung der Haushaltsziele für die kommenden Jahre. Da der 
Finanzminister im Vergleich zu den anderen Fachministern nicht für bestimmte 
Politikprojekte verantwortlich ist, unterliegt er darüber hinaus weniger starken Anreizen die 
Ausgabenseite des Budgets überzustrapazieren. Ganz im Gegenteil: Es ist vielmehr die 
institutionelle Aufgabe eines Finanzministers, den exzessiven Ausgabenwünschen der 
Fachminister Einhalt zu gebieten. Er ist somit der Minister im Kabinett, der den Haushalt als 
Ganzes im Blick und damit das größte Interesse an soliden Staatsfinanzen hat. 
Jedoch gibt es bis heute nur sehr wenige Studien, die explizit den Einfluss persönlicher 
Politikermerkmale auf fiskalische Performance untersuchen. Die Innovationen der 
vorliegenden Arbeit liegen demnach in drei Bereichen: Zum ersten ist es nach bestem Wissen 
des Autors die erste deskriptive Analyse persönlicher Merkmale europäischer Finanzminister 
auf der nationalen Ebene. Zweitens erweitert sie die Literatur zu den Bestimmungsfaktoren 
der Entwicklung der Staatsverschuldung, indem explizit persönliche Merkmale der jeweiligen 
Finanzminister in das Untersuchungsdesign aufgenommen werden. Drittens ist die 
vorliegende Untersuchung die erste Studie, die dabei die persönlichen Merkmale von 
Finanzministern mit denen ihrer jeweiligen Regierungschefs kombiniert. 
Die Untersuchungen fokussieren auf drei unterschiedliche persönliche Merkmale von 
europäischen Finanzministern im Zeitraum 1980 bis 2010: Erfahrung, Ausbildung und 
Ideologie. Vor allem die fachliche als auch politische Erfahrung eines Finanzministers ist von 
Bedeutung. Die Zunahme (Abnahme) der Schuldenstandsquote ist geringer (höher), je länger 
der Finanzminister im Amt ist. Gleiches gilt für den Indikator ‚politischer Erfahrung‘: Je mehr 
Erfahrung ein Finanzminister in vorherigen Positionen als Kabinettsmitglied gesammelt hat, 
desto geringer ist das Haushaltsdefizit (desto größer ist der Haushaltsüberschuss). Während 
der erstgenannte Indikator einem potentiellen Endogenitätsproblem unterliegt, lässt sich der 
Einfluss ‚politischer Erfahrung‘ darüber hinaus kausal interpretieren. Hingegen haben die 
Ideologie sowie die Ausbildung eines Finanzministers keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf die 
Entwicklung der Staatsverschuldung. 
Die Ergebnisse stehen im Einklang mit der eingangs erläuterten Theorie: Die institutionelle 
Funktion eines Finanzministers ist es, übermäßige Ausgabenwünsche der Kabinettsmitglieder 
einzudämmen. Es ist somit realistisch anzunehmen, dass insbesondere politisch erfahrene und 
einflussreiche Finanzminister dieser Aufgabe im Besonderen gerecht werden können. Ein 
Finanzminister, der lange Jahre als Fachminister gearbeitet hat, hat demnach komparative 
Vorteile gegenüber politisch unerfahrenen Finanzministern erworben, die er in seiner neuen 
Funktion zur Durchsetzung der Haushaltsziele einsetzen kann. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The role of the finance minister differs in various aspects from that of the remaining cabinet 
members. His main task is to enforce overall budgetary objectives. Depending on the 
organization of the budget process, the finance minister’s functions range from monitoring 
and enforcing negotiated budgetary objectives to setting the fiscal agenda for the upcoming 
years (von Hagen et al., 2001). Furthermore, he serves as a natural counterweight to the 
spending ministers. In order to convince their voters and to increase their re-election chances, 
each of the latter tends to attract as many funds as possible for his own projects (Swank, 
2002). The finance minister’s objectives, on the contrary, are different. Apart from his 
original budget task, the finance minister is not primarily responsible for specific spending 
projects. This dissolves his incentives to exploit pork barrel projects (Hallerberg and von 
Hagen, 1999). Additionally, the finance minister’s peer group is the whole electorate instead 
of particular groups of the society. While the latter also holds true for the foreign minister or 
the minister of defence, for instance, the finance minister’s institutional function in the cabinet 
is to have a comprehensive view of the budget and to resist the emerging spending pressures 
of his colleagues. The finance minister is thus the cabinet member who has the strongest 
interest in sound public finance and has a comprehensive view of the budget (von Hagen, 
2002; Hallerberg et al., 2009). He is expected to act as the fiscal conscience of the 
government, which also includes policies aimed at debt reduction or at least at debt retaining 
strategies. Taken together, solely the prime minister’s position in the cabinet is similarly 
accentuated. The prime minister’s function, however, is first and foremost to be the head of 
the government. This includes setting the general policy guidelines and ‘pulling the team 
together’. The finance minister, on the contrary, is supposed to be the fiscal expert of the 
government. Nevertheless, a finance minister’s impact on fiscal policy decisions also depends 
on the backing of his prime minister (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999). 
However, most of the public choice literature on the determinants of the development of 
public finance refers to the role of fiscal institutions (e.g. fiscal rules, see for instance Debrun 
et al. (2008)), electoral procedures (e.g. direct democracy (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001)), 
political determinants (e.g. government fragmentation (Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999; 
Volkerink and de Haan, 2001)) or budgetary procedures (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Hallerberg et al., 2009).  
Opposed to this, there is a growing literature which focuses on the impact of personal 
characteristics of decision makers, see for instance Besley et al. (2011) and Dreher et al. 
(2009) for economic growth, or Farvaque et al. (2009; 2011) and Göhlmann and Vaubel 
(2007) with respect to monetary policy. In the field of fiscal policy, however, such 
investigations are still scarce: Somogyi (2010) and Mikosch (2011) examine the impact of 
personal characteristics of national leaders on public surpluses and public deficits while 
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Jochimsen and Thomasius (2011) focus on the impact of personal characteristics of 
subnational German finance ministers on public deficits. There is, however, no paper which 
explicitly investigates the impact of personal characteristics of national finance ministers on 
the development of public debt. 
This paper’s innovations are thus threefold: To the best of my knowledge, it is the first 
description of personal characteristics of national finance ministers in Europe for the period 
1980 – 2010. Second, it extends the literature on the determinants of public debt by the, so far, 
largely neglected impact factors of one of the most relevant decision makers, and third, it is 
the first investigation which combines personal characteristics of finance ministers with those 
of their prime ministers. 
To answer the question of whether personal characteristics of finance ministers affect the 
development of public debt, I use a unique dataset of personal characteristics of European 
national finance ministers and their respective prime ministers for the period 1980 – 2010. In 
a nutshell, the results reveal that especially a finance minister’s experience gained in office as 
well as his political experience have an impact on the development of public debt: The change 
of the debt to GDP ratio is negative the more experience a finance minister has gained as 
minister of finance or in former positions as a national cabinet member. While the former 
result suffers from potential endogeneity, several arguments support that the latter result can 
be interpreted in a causal way. In contrast, a finance minister’s educational background or 
ideology has no significant impact on public debt changes.  
The paper is organised as follows: In the next section, the relevant literature concerning the 
importance of the minister of finance and the relevance of personal characteristics is 
reviewed. Furthermore, hypotheses on the impact of finance minister characteristics are 
drawn. Section 3 describes the collected data and the estimation procedure. The results and 
further discussions are given in Section 4, whereas concluding remarks are offered in  
Section 5. 
 
2 Strength of the finance minister and personal characteristics 
 
There are several authors who stress the specific meaning of the finance minister within the 
budget process. In a theoretical model, van der Ploeg (2010) shows that the appointment of a 
strong finance minister can offset the common-pool problem within the government. A strong 
finance minister with at least as many voting rights as all spending ministers together “can 
thus control the claims of his spending colleagues and avoid excessive debt accumulation” 
(van der Ploeg, 2010, p. 311). In another model, Swank (2002) shows that the appointment of 
a spending-averse finance minister is a superior tool to derive fiscal discipline as compared to  
implementing binding budget targets. 
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With respect to empirical papers, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999), von Hagen (2002), Borge 
(2005), Hallerberg et al. (2007) and Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) also refer to the importance 
of a “strong minister of finance”. In most of these articles, the strength of the finance minister 
is derived from the budget process: A finance minister seems to be strong if the delegation 
approach (i.e. the finance minister is vested with particular prerogatives) instead of the 
contract approach (i.e. a binding agreement about fiscal targets among the relevant decision 
makers) is used. Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2010) view a finance minister as strong if he 
belongs to the same party as the prime minister. They show that governments with weak 
finance ministers issue significantly more debt as compared to governments with strong 
finance ministers. In all these articles, however, the impact of a finance minister is derived 
from an institutional perspective and lacks the inclusion of personal characteristics of the 
respective incumbent.  
Solely Jochimsen and Thomasius (2011) explicitly focus on the personal characteristics of 
finance ministers. Their study refers to the impact of personal characteristics of finance 
ministers on the development of public deficits in the Western German Länder from 1960 – 
2009. The authors show that especially a finance minister’s former professional background, 
e.g. in the financial sector, leads to lower deficits. The finance minister’s experience 
(measured by the time spent in office), by contrast, seems to have only a limited impact on 
deficits. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no paper which explicitly investigates 
the impact of personal characteristics of national finance ministers on the development of 
public debt. To shed light on this issue, I employ three different types of personal 
characteristics: experience, education and ideology. Both the existing evidence concerning 
these indicators in various fields of economics and hypotheses on the expected impact are 
discussed in the following. 
 
(1) Experience 
 
There are several studies in which measures of a politician’s experience are included. For 
instance, in a time-series analysis of fiscal policy for Switzerland, Feld and Schaltegger 
(2010) use the time the finance minister has spent in office. They show that more experienced 
finance ministers increase the budget surplus and reduce government spending. The authors, 
however, do not find a significant impact of a finance minister’s experience in office on the 
development of public debt and on federal revenues. With respect to the implementation of 
market liberalising reforms, Dreher et al. (2009) also use the time the chief executive has been 
in office to measure experience. They find a negative impact, significant at the 10-percent 
level, meaning that the pace of implementing reforms decreases the longer the incumbent has 
spent in office.  
Concerning the development of public debt, a finance minister’s experience should matter for 
several reasons. The more experienced a finance minister is, the better his chances of 
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influencing policy decisions: As compared to a finance minister who is relatively 
inexperienced, a senior finance minister knows more about the tricks of his cabinet colleagues 
to attract more money to their ministries. More experience thus strengthens the finance 
minister’s chances of resisting spending pressures by his colleagues and building reputation in 
office (Feld and Schaltegger, 2010). Furthermore, a senior finance minister is well aware of 
the political pitfalls in which an inexperienced colleague might be entangled. This argument 
refers to both the internal and the external competition, since a finance minister has to 
convince his cabinet colleagues and the public as well. This implies that a finance minister’s 
persuasiveness is important too. It is thus reasonable to assume that a finance minister’s self-
assertion increases with rising experience. Thereby, experience can be grouped into technical 
and political experience. Technical experience refers to experience in the field of fiscal policy. 
The finance minister’s effort to familiarise with fiscal policy issues reduces since he is well 
aware of the technical details. This also implies that he knows about the country’s specific 
problems which facilitates both the chances to identify the causes of mounting debt and to 
develop starting points for solutions which are then capable of winning a majority. Political 
experience, by contrast, refers to a finance minister’s knowledge about the political game 
being played. He knows about the political ways of decision making, has knowledge in the 
field of media relations and communication with the public on the national level, and is on 
familiar ground with political intrigues. Summing up, with reference to experience the 
following hypotheses can be drawn: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Experience strengthens the position of the finance minister in the cabinet: The 
growth of public debt should slow down, the more technical or political experience a finance 
minister has gained.  
Hypothesis 1b: A finance minister with greater persuasive power has more chances to 
convince both the public and the cabinet of a sustainable debt management plan. This reflects 
in negative changes of public debt.  
 
(2) Education 
 
The educational background of a finance minister is the second personal characteristic of 
interest. There are several studies investigating the impact of better trained and better 
educated politicians on policy outcomes. With respect to an economy’s growth, Besley et al. 
(2011) show that better educated leaders increase a country’s GDP growth. Following Jones 
and Olken (2005), the authors use random leadership transitions based on unexpected deaths 
and show that the better (worse) educated a departing leader is, the lower (higher) the growth 
of GDP after the leader transition. Results in a similar vein are given by Dreher et al. (2009). 
In their paper, the authors investigate the impact of a political leader’s profession and 
education on the implementation of market liberalising reforms. In particular, a leader’s 
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professional background, e.g. being a former entrepreneur, is a significant determinant in 
explaining a country’s reform orientation. With respect to presidents of the United States, 
Congleton and Zhang (2009) show that higher educated presidents have a positive impact on 
the economy’s growth.  
In the field of monetary policy, Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) also underpin the impact of a 
central banker’s former occupation on his inflation performance. Especially former members 
of the central bank staff prefer lower inflation rates as compared to former politicians. These 
results are endorsed by Farvaque et al. (2009; 2011), who use more recent data.  
With respect to fiscal policy, however, only few studies look at the educational impact of 
politicians on either debt or deficit development. Somogyi (2011) investigates the impact of 
personal characteristics of political leaders on public finances. Both the professional and 
educational background of national leaders in 22 OECD countries are used. The author shows 
that particularly former white collar workers minimise the public surplus. The same holds true 
for natural scientists and leaders with university degrees other than economics and law. By 
employing subnational data for the German Länder, Hayo and Neumeier (2011) focus on the 
impact of the socio-economic status of prime ministers on fiscal performance. This socio-
economic status thereby comprises, e.g., a person’s occupation and education, his income, but 
also his prestige. They find that the better a prime minister’s parental status and his own status 
are, the lower the public borrowing. 
The particular impact of an economic education has been shown by O'Roark and Wood 
(2011). The authors present evidence in the field of public policy and show that US congress 
members who are graduates in economics are significantly less likely to vote for a minimum 
wage increase. Evidence in the same direction is presented by Heinemann et al. (2009). 
European Parliament members having an academic background in economics are more 
opposed to the introduction of an EU tax as compared to non-economic trained parliament 
members. Taken together, the evidence supports the assumption that a politician’s educational 
background affects policy decisions. 
However, the formerly mentioned studies mostly focus on the education of the head of 
government or parliament members. As explained before, there are good arguments 
supporting the assumption that personal characteristics of the minister of finance should 
matter as well, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: With respect to debt-reducing strategies and compared to a non-economic 
education, economists have advantages which range from a faster identification of  
problems to a better implementation of solution principles. Furthermore, based on personal 
reputation, there are communication advantages with respect to the remaining cabinet 
members or to the public. I therefore expect the change of the public debt to be negative for 
finance ministers who are trained economists. 
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(3) Ideology 
 
The third personal characteristic concerns a finance minister’s ideology. Two theories can be 
consulted to shed light on this issue. On the one hand, the partisan approach supports the 
meaning of a party’s ideology, i.e. politicians implement those policies which correspond to 
their voters’ preferences. On the other hand, the political business cycle approach states that 
party ideology is rather negligible and party policies converge. This especially holds true 
before elections. To enhance their re-election chances, both left-wing and right-wing parties 
are in favour of expansionary policies. However, the empirical evidence concerning these 
theories is mixed (for an overview of recent studies see Potrafke, 2012).  
Concerning the partisan approach, there are good arguments supporting the assumption that 
public spending is higher if there is a left-wing government or a head of state with left 
ideology. For instance, it is commonly assumed that left-wing governments are more in 
favour of stabilisation policies and redistribution, whereas right-wing governments are rather 
fiscal conservatives and care about financial variables like price stability and small deficits 
(Cusack, 1997). If public spending is higher for leftist governments, this should also have an 
effect on public deficits and public debt, i.e. the public debt should be higher for left-wing 
governments than for right-wing governments (Neck and Getzner, 2001). However, de Haan 
and Sturm (1994; 1997) and Hahm et al. (1996) do not find a significant impact of ideology 
on public debt. 
Turning to the theory of political business cycles, two seminal theoretical contributions by 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989) show that the development of 
public debt might also be influenced by the re-election chances of the respective government. 
Policy makers can use public debt to influence the choices of their successors (Alesina and 
Tabellini, 1990), which may result in higher debt for right-wing as compared to left-wing 
governments. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) supports these theoretical predictions empirically. In 
case the government believes that it will be replaced with certainty, he finds that right-wing 
governments increase their debt levels by 15 percent, whereas left-wing governments 
decrease debt levels by 11 percent. This result might also be explained by the role of 
signalling information to the electorate. To enhance his general credibility, a politician might 
act in the opposite way as expected by his own constituency (Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998; 
for an empirical investigation see Tavares, 2004).  
Taken together, the predictions of whether there is an impact of a finance minister’s ideology 
on the development of public finance are rather vague and ambiguous. The public debt might 
be higher if the finance minister is leftist; however, the public debt might also be lower as 
compared to centre and right-wing politicians, because the finance minister wants to signal 
credibility to the whole electorate. I therefore test the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 3a: Partisan Theory: The change of public debt is positive if the finance minister 
is member of a left party.  
Hypothesis 3b: The change of public debt is positive and increases if the finance minister is 
member of a left party and faces an election. 
 
(4) Institutional environment and economic development 
 
The impact of finance minister characteristics on the development of public debt might also 
depend on the institutional environment. Referring to the budget process, for instance, in most 
developed countries either the delegation approach or the contract approach is used to derive 
budgetary decisions. In this context, delegation means to vest one particular actor within the 
budget process (usually the minister of finance) with significant strategic power over the other 
participants. The key characteristics are strong agenda-setting power, strong monitoring 
power, and a strong position of the executive over the legislative. In opposition to this, the 
contract approach rests on an agreement about binding fiscal targets among the relevant 
decision makers of the budget process. In contrast to the delegation approach, the minister of 
finance has little rights at the planning stage, but monitors and enforces the fiscal contract 
(von Hagen et al., 2001). Taken together, the type of the budget process enlarges or narrows a 
finance minister’s scope of action, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The stronger the institutional role of the finance minister, the more favourable 
the impact of his personal characteristics is on the development of public debt.  
 
Furthermore, as compared to a balanced economic development, it is reasonable to assume 
that personal characteristics like experience or an economic education pay off particularly in 
economic prosperous or unfavourable times. In times of high GDP growth, for instance, most 
spending ministers succumb to the temptation of attracting parts of the additional tax revenues 
for their ministries. Such behaviour, however, contradicts the economic needs of budget 
consolidation. As compared to other finance ministers, a highly experienced finance minister 
or a finance minister with an educational background in economics should then have better 
chances of resisting the additional spending pressures of his colleagues.  
 
Hypothesis 5: More experienced or economic-educated finance ministers should retain 
excessive debt growth in unfavourable times but enhance debt reduction in prosperous times. 
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3 Data and empirical method 
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
I have created a unique dataset of different personal characteristics of national finance 
ministers. The data are collected for 15 Western-European countries (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom)1 and cover the time period 1980 – 2010. 
All personal data originate from research on official national websites, e.g. websites of 
national ministries of finance or parliamentary websites, and are matched with macro-
economic, structural, and political data (explained below).  
 
(1) Experience measures 
 
As explained before, experience can be subdivided into technical and political experience. 
While technical experience refers to experience in the field of fiscal policy, political 
experience implies that the finance minister understands the rules of the political game and 
knows about political snares. Taken together, both sorts of experience should increase a 
finance minister’s chances to prevent excessive debt growth and to overcome political and 
public veto players.  
I have chosen several indicators to measure both sorts of experience. The first indicator 
measures the experience a finance minister has gained in office (years in office). The variable 
is continuous and increases by one for every additional year the finance minister has spent in 
office for at least eight months. If this was not the case because, for instance, there was a 
change of incumbency, the variable remains constant on the initial value. Furthermore, there 
are finance ministers who left office but returned after some waiting time. In these cases, the 
initial value for the second period is the highest value of years in office from the first period. 
Since both the understanding of the budget process and the political process increase the 
longer the finance minister remains in office, the indicator comprises both political and 
technical experience. 
The second indicator then refers to experience gained before the appointment as national 
finance minister. I have created a variable indicating the number of years the finance minister 
has served as a national spending minister in previous legislative periods (previous years 
cabinet member). As compared to the measure of office experience, this variable solely 
captures the political experience of a finance minister. When starting office he already knows 
                                                 
1 Switzerland is not included since finance ministers in Switzerland have mainly representative tasks but cannot 
impact on policy decisions as it is the case in the remaining countries. Belgium is not part of the sample since it 
was not possible to collect data on Belgian finance ministers for the sample period. 
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how to act as a minister on the national level and should thus be able to pursue his targets 
much easier as compared to other finance ministers without such experience. Opposed to this, 
the third indicator solely reflects technical experience in the field of fiscal policy (fiscal policy 
experience). It is a dummy variable which is one if the finance minister has had any practical 
connections to fiscal policy topics in former positions. Examples comprise public finance 
town councils, advisors to the ministry of finance, financial speakers or members of 
parliament working in the finance committee. Furthermore, I also include a finance minister’s 
age to control for a finance minister’s life experience. 
Concerning hypothesis 1b, a measure for a finance minister’s power of persuasion is 
necessary. Since it is not possible to measure persuasiveness directly, I have decided to use 
the following proxy: The dummy variable cabinet member after recall comprises whether the 
finance minister remains in the cabinet after having been recalled from the ministry of 
finance. The variable equals one if a finance minister has either served as a spending minister 
or as a prime minister after his dismissal from office. From my point of view, this reflects 
being a political heavyweight which also includes information about self-assertion and 
persuasiveness.2  
 
Descriptive statistics about the experience measures of finance ministers are shown in Table 
1. The first column indicates the total number of finance ministers within the regarded period 
(1980 - 2010). Evidently, Luxembourg is different from other countries: Within the regarded 
30 years, there were only three ministers of finance. Beside this particularity, there are further 
differences between the selected countries. While in the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain 
only six or seven different ministers have served as finance ministers, in France, Greece and 
Italy 13 or 12 finance ministers have been at work. In the Scandinavian countries Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland 10 or 9 finance ministers held office. 
In the next two main-columns, values for the continuous measures years in office and 
previous years cabinet member are shown. Again, Luxembourg is different from other 
countries with an average of a finance minister’s office experience of 10.3 years. This is due 
to the long office period of Jean-Claude Juncker, who served as the Luxembourgian finance 
minister from 14 July 1989 until 23 July 2009. Finance ministers in Italy, France, Portugal 
and Greece only gain office experience of around two or two and a half years on average. On 
the contrary, finance ministers in the Netherlands, Germany or Spain work for four to five 
years on average. In main-column 3, the average number of years a finance minister has 
gained experience as national cabinet member before his appointment is given. In each of the 
selected countries, at least one finance minister has worked as national spending minister 
before his appointment. However, remarkable differences between the countries exist: In 
                                                 
2 I have also tried to distinguish between becoming a prime minister or a spending minister. The number of 
observations for the former, however, is too small to enable valid estimations. 
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Denmark and Ireland, for instance, all or nearly all finance ministers have served as national 
spending ministers before their appointment. On the contrary, in the Netherlands, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom, only 20 to 30 percent of finance ministers have gained some 
ministerial experience before taking over office. The average years of former ministerial 
experience are also important. Finance ministers in the Netherlands have served as national 
cabinet members for nine years on average before becoming minister of finance. This is 
remarkable, especially if the rather low share of finance ministers with former cabinet 
experience is considered. In comparison, finance ministers in Austria and Portugal have only 
gained two years of cabinet experience before their appointment. 
Column 4 gives information about the number of finance ministers who stayed in the cabinet 
after having been recalled as minister of finance (cabinet member after recall). Taken 
together, in each country at least one minister of finance remained in the cabinet after his 
dismissal. However, there are remarkable differences between the different countries. In 
Denmark, Portugal Spain, and Sweden, for instance, the finance minister who stayed in the 
cabinet simultaneously became prime minister. In countries in which many finance ministers 
remain in the cabinet, by contrast, none or only one or two finance minister served as prime 
minister after dismissal; see for instance France, Greece and Italy. Turning over to fiscal 
policy experience (column 5), with the exception of finance ministers in Ireland, at least one 
third of finance ministers hadn’t had any connection to fiscal policy before appointment. The 
highest shares are found in the Netherlands and Spain. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Experience measures for Finance Ministers (1980 – 2010) 
 Finance ministers 
Years in 
office 
Previous years 
cabinet member 
Cabinet member 
after recall 
Fiscal policy 
experience 
 No. (FM) Avg. (Years) No. (FM) Avg. (Years) No. (FM) % No. (FM) % 
Austria 10 4.0 5 2.6 3 30 3 30 
Denmark 10 3.6 10 4.4 1 10 4 40 
Finland 9 3.4 4 4.5 2 22 3 33 
France 13 2.2 7 4.4 5 38 6 46 
Germany 7 4.6 3 5.3 2 28 3 42 
Greece 13 2.2 4 3.3 5 38 7 53 
Ireland 11 2.5 10 4.7 8 72 2 18 
Italy 12 2.3 6 4.2 8 66 6 50 
Luxembourg 3 10.3 2 9.0 2 66 2 66 
Netherlands 6 5.2 1 9.0 3 50 5 83 
Norway 10 3.0 3 6.3 5 50 7 70 
Portugal 11 2.6 3 2.0 1 9 5 45 
Spain 7 4.4 3 5.7 1 14 6 85 
Sweden 10 3.4 4 3.8 1 10 5 50 
UK 8 3.3 2 5.0 2 25 5 62 
Notes: The table refers to the period 1980 – 2010 and includes four different experience measures for finance 
ministers. Office experience is a measure of the years the finance minister has stayed in office. Previous years as 
cabinet member is the number of years a finance minister was in the cabinet before appointment, but not as 
minister of finance. Cabinet member after recall and fiscal policy experience are dummy variables. 
- 11 - 
 
(2) Educational variables 
 
Since most finance ministers in the regarded period have either studied economics, law or 
both economics and law, a further subdivision of the remaining educational categories is 
abortive. I have coded four different education categories: economic education, law 
education, other education and unknown education. The variables are coded as dummy 
variables which equal one if the finance minister has an educational background in this field 
of study and zero otherwise. Students of business administration are coded as economists.3 
Other education subsumes remaining (but known) university studies and further professional 
trainings. If a finance minister has studied both economics and law, he is denoted with an 
educational background in economics and an educational background in law, respectively. 
 
Information about the development of the educational background of finance ministers over 
time is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, most finance ministers have an educational 
background in economics. Starting in the mid-1990s, the share of finance ministers who have 
studied law intensifies. Furthermore, the number of finance ministers with an unknown 
educational background vanishes in the beginning of the new century. This is due to the 
improvement of data availability in line with new media coverage. 
 
Figure 1: Development of finance minister education over time 
 
 
Detailed statistics per country are given in Table 2. The first part of this table indicates the 
number of finance ministers per educational category, while the second part of the table 
provides information about percentage shares in relation to the overall number of finance 
ministers per country. As can be seen in the last line, exactly one half of the finance ministers 
                                                 
3 A separate regression where students of business administration are excluded is part of the robustness check. 
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have an educational background in economics (divided in 39% economics and 11% business 
administration), while there are relatively equal shares of law (29%) and other education 
(23%). Most of the finance ministers in Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and Italy have 
studied economics as opposed to only 11 to 23 percent of finance ministers in Finland and 
France. By contrast, most finance ministers in Austria have studied business administration 
(60%). Adding up the shares of business administration and economics, Norway is also one of 
the countries which trusts an economic education for finance ministers. In Luxembourg, all 
finance ministers have studied law. Concerning the remaining countries, 10 to 30 percent of 
the finance ministers have studied law. The exception is Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom 
with shares of approximately 40 to 50 percent. Countries like Sweden and Finland further rely 
on finance ministers with an educational background other than economics or law. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Educational Background of Finance Ministers (1980 – 2010) 
 Number of 
Finance 
Ministers 
Number Percent 
Country 
Economic 
education 
MBA 
education 
Law 
education 
Other 
education 
Unknown 
education 
Economic 
education 
MBA 
education 
Law 
education 
Other 
education 
Unknown 
education 
Austria 10 2 6 2 0 0 20 60 20 0 0 
Denmark 10 4 1 3 1 1 40 10 30 10 10 
Finland 9 1 1 1 4 2 11 11 11 44 22 
France 13 3 0 4 4 3 23 0 31 31 23 
Germany 7 3 0 2 2 0 43 0 29 29 0 
Greece 13 7 0 3 2 2 54 0 23 15 15 
Ireland 11 2 1 4 5 0 18 9 36 45 0 
Italy* 12 8 0 6 2 0 67 0 50 17 0 
Luxembourg 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 
Netherlands 6 4 1 1 0 0 67 17 17 0 0 
Norway 10 3 2 3 3 0 30 20 30 30 0 
Portugal 11 9 1 1 0 0 82 9 9 0 0 
Spain 7 5 1 3 0 0 71 14 43 0 0 
Sweden 10 2 1 1 6 0 20 10 10 60 0 
United Kingdom 8 2 0 3 3 0 25 0 38 38 0 
Sample 140 55 15 40 32 8 39 11 29 23 6 
Notes: The table refers to the period 1980 – 2010 and includes the educational background for finance ministers per country. The percentage shares do not necessarily add up to 
100 percent since some finance ministers have an educational background in both economics/MBA and law. 
*     Until 2001, several ministries in Italy were charged with financial topics (Ministero delle Finanze, Ministero del Tesoro, Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione 
economica and Ministero delle Partecipazioni Statali). Concerning the development of public debt, only the Ministero del Tesoro (Treasury) is decisive. Thus, all collected 
data for Italian ministers of finance refer to this ministry (Ministero dell'Economica et delle Finanze, 2001). 
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(3) Ideological leaning 
 
The third personal characteristic concerns a finance minister’s ideology. To test the 
hypothesis, I use party affiliation as a proxy. The dummy variable left ideology is coded one if 
the finance minister is a member of a left party (zero otherwise).4 The data about a party’s 
ideological leaning are taken from the database of political institutions (DPI) provided by 
Beck et al. (2001). 
 
(4) Further variables 
 
I have decided to use central government debt to GDP (CGD) as the dependent variable. 
Applying this measure is straightforward: Since the impact of personal characteristics of 
finance ministers on public debt changes is investigated, the dependent variable should not be 
biased by influences not under direct control of the national finance minister. Using general 
public debt instead would bias the estimation, as it is also influenced by subnational and local 
developments. Even if changes in general government debt are mainly influenced on the 
national level, using central government debt instead of general government debt should be 
the appropriate measure.  
The development of the change of CGD is shown in Figure 2. As can be seen from the graph, 
the underlying trend differs between groups of countries. In Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 
for instance, the fitted values reveal a negative trend whereas there is a positive trend in the 
development of the change of public debt in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece. 
 
                                                 
4 Finance ministers who are independent are labelled according to the ideological majority of the governing 
parties. 
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Figure 2: The change of the central government debt to GDP ratio per country 
 
Notes: Data for central government debt are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook database and merged with 
data from Jaimovich and Panizza (2006). 
 
The selection of covariates is based on the literature of the determinants of public debt 
development (Roubini and Sachs, 1989b; Roubini and Sachs, 1989a; Edin and Ohlsson, 1991; 
de Haan and Sturm, 1994; de Haan and Sturm, 1997; Hallerberg et al., 2007). Three different 
groups are distinguished: macro-economic, structural, and political controls. The data are 
collected from various sources; a detailed description is given in the appendix (Table A5).  
 
Macro-economic controls include a country’s unemployment rate, the lagged debt level, the 
real growth of GDP and the real long term interest rates. These variables are expected to 
work as automatic stabilisers, i.e. a lower unemployment rate and a higher GDP growth 
should reduce public debt. The impact of the lagged debt level, however, is ex ante not that 
clear. While it captures the inter-temporal budget constraint, i.e. raising debt levels in the past 
should lead to declining levels in the future, there might also be some path dependency, 
causing persistent mounting debt levels. The same holds true for real long term interest rates.  
 
Concerning the structural covariates, a country’s population and a measure of a country’s 
openness are included. Openness is defined as the sum of exports and imports as a share of 
GDP. Since more open countries benefit from greater global competitiveness, they should be 
less likely to suffer from global economic shocks. This should also have a negative impact on 
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a country’s debt growth. The effect of a greater population, on the contrary, is not that clear. 
Due to economies of scale, a rising population reduces per capita costs for public good 
provisions and can therefore reduce public debt in the long run. Going back to Brecht’s law 
(1932), however, a rising population might also push public debt through rising spending 
pressure of the society.  
 
Political controls are a dummy variable for election years, thus controlling for electoral cycles 
and a measure of government fragmentation. As has been pointed out by Volkerink and de 
Haan (2001) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002), government fragmentation is an important 
determinant of deficit growth. The more fragmented a government is, the higher the growth of 
deficits. The evidence for electoral cycles is ambiguous: Shi and Svensson (2006) show, for 
instance, that the timing of elections affects budget deficits. The effects, however, are mostly 
driven by developing countries; see also Drazen (2001). Both variables are taken from the 
DPI (Beck et al., 2001). The dummy variable election year is equal to one if there was a 
legislative or executive election in a particular year. Government fragmentation is defined as 
the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be 
of two different parties and is given in a percentage. Thus, the higher this share is, the more 
fragmented the government. The summary statistics for all variables are given in the appendix 
(Table A1). 
 
3.2 Estimation procedure 
 
I estimate panel data regressions. The basic equation takes the following form: 
 
(1) ∆CGDi,t =   β0 + β1 Experiencei,t + β2 EducationalBackgroundi,t 
   + β3 LeftIdeologyi,t + β4 Controlsi,t + TimeTrendi,t + αi  + µt + εi,t. 
 
The dependent variable is the change of the central government debt to GDP ratio for country 
i in year t. Due to a lack of data for the dependent variable, the sample is restricted to years 
after 1980.5 Experience is the vector of experience measures for finance ministers; 
EducationalBackground represents the set of different educational variables and LeftIdeology 
is the measure of a finance minister’s ideology. Controls is the vector of the macro-economic, 
political, and structural control variables explained before. TimeTrend is a linear, country-
specific time trend to control for different trends in the development of public debt per 
country, whereas αi and µt are fixed country and time effects and εi,t is the disturbance term. 
As estimation method I use OLS with country-fixed effects and heteroscedasticity-corrected 
                                                 
5 Since the dependent variable is the change of central government debt, the first observation is in 1981. 
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robust standard errors. Time-fixed effects are included to control for time events like the 
recent debt crisis or further common shocks. The error terms are clustered on an individual 
level for each finance minister.  
 
Due to national elections, in some years more than one minister of finance bears responsibility 
for public finance. To enable fixed effects panel estimations, however, particular finance 
ministers must be excluded from the raw data, i.e. the finance minister data must be adjusted 
so that there is only one finance minister per year. In the basic specification, the algorithm is 
as follows:6 If the national finance minister within a particular year changes once, e.g. due to 
elections or for other reasons, the finance minister who served longest remains in the dataset. 
This also applies if there is more than one change of incumbency of finance ministers within a 
particular year, i.e. only the finance minister who served longest is retained. If two finance 
ministers have served for six months, only the finance minister who served in the second half 
of the year is kept. An overview about those ministers who are excluded due to insufficient 
incumbency periods is given in the appendix (Table A2).7  
Due to missing observations for further variables, the final dataset is an unbalanced panel. In 
particular, observations for the variables CGD (especially in Finland, France, Greece and 
Luxembourg) and the real long term interest rate are missing for some years in some 
countries. An overview of the included time span per country is given in the appendix (Table 
A3). 
 
Several limitations of the investigation must be stressed. The first concerns the identification 
of causal effects. Both selection issues and problems of reverse causality hinder a clear 
interpretation. Concerning reverse causality, Brender and Drazen (2008) have shown that high 
deficits in election years reduce re-election perspectives of the government. This may also 
have an impact on the measure of a finance minister’s office experience (years in office), i.e. a 
finance minister might get voted out of office or will be displaced if deficits or debt levels 
reach a critical threshold. One possible solution to solve this problem relies on using an 
instrumental variable estimator. However, so far I could not come up with a suitable 
instrument. In line with the strategy implemented by Jones and Olken (2005), another solution 
to this problem would be using random finance minister transitions. Since the number of 
exogenous transitions due to death, e.g., is too little it is, however, not possible to apply this 
method in the given context. Nevertheless, the problem of reverse causality especially applies 
to the measure of office experience whereas further experience measures like the previous 
years as cabinet member do not suffer from this sort of bias. Here, by contrast, (self-)selection 
issues come into play. Since especially highly experienced finance ministers could be 
                                                 
6 A second algorithm is part of the robustness checks (explained below). 
7 For example, the Irish finance minister Charles Haughey only served from 7 November 1991 to 14 November 
1991 and was thus excluded from raw data of finance ministers for the year 1991. 
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nominated in the face of rising debt, there also might be confounding effects of this 
experience measure. This also holds true for the educational variables, i.e. especially 
economists might be installed if debt levels reach a critical threshold. I have controlled for 
this issue by comparing the shares of finance ministers who have an educational background 
in economics or have gained former cabinet experience if the change of the debt to GDP ratio 
was positive and negative. The results are shown in Table 3. Since I particularly focus on 
selection issues, only years in which the finance minister has changed are regarded. A t-test is 
done to check whether the differences in the means of new incumbents with economic 
education or former experience are different from zero or not. The results do not point 
towards a selection bias, i.e. the t-statistic supports the null-hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between the means of economic education or former cabinet experience 
with respect to the development of public debt.  
 
Table 3: Economic education and former cabinet experience of new incumbents 
New incumbent is economist Observations Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
A: ΔCGD ≤ 0 51 0.333 0.067 0.476 
B: ΔCGD > 0 138 0.442 0.042 0.498 
Combined (A+B) 189 0.412 0.036 0.493 
Difference = mean(A) - mean(B)  -0.108 0.081  
H0: Difference = 0 t = -1.3466    
H1: Difference != 0 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1797   
New incumbent has cabinet experience Observations Mean  Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
A: ΔCGD ≤ 0 51 0.588 0.069 0.497 
B: ΔCGD > 0 138 0.565 0.042 0.497 
Combined (A+B) 189 0.571 0.036 0.496 
Difference = mean(A) - mean(B)  0.023 0.081  
H0: Difference = 0 t = 0.2824    
H1: Difference != 0 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7780   
Notes: Cabinet experience refers to the variable previous experience cabinet member and is coded as ‘yes’ or 
‘no’, i.e. there is no distinction concerning the number of years. 
 
Finally, the underlying value judgement should be mentioned. Most hypotheses include 
assumptions concerning a desirable development of public debt, i.e. rising budget surpluses 
and declining levels of public debt are judged as valuable for the society. While there are 
many arguments supporting this assumption (think, e.g., of the problems in line with the 
recent debt crisis in Europe), there are also arguments backing the contrasting view. That is, 
even if a finance minister confines excessive spending by his colleagues, he might prefer a 
moderate advance of public debt to meet the society’s preferences. 
Taken together, the limited kind of ambition my investigation is able to handle must be 
stressed: It allows for testing to what degree the data structure and correlations fit in with 
theories backed by the literature. Nonetheless, the results can point towards, so far, largely 
neglected impact factors on public debt development, which then should be part of further 
research on this topic. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Personal characteristics of finance ministers 
 
Table 4 shows the results for the impact of personal characteristics of finance ministers on the 
development of public debt. In the first seven columns, the separate impact of the different 
personal characteristics is shown, while the joint impact of all variables is given in column 8.  
 
Starting with the specific questions of this research, a finance minister’s experience seems to 
have an impact on the development of public debt. Especially the years a finance minister 
spends in office (years in office) and the number of years during which a finance minister has 
gained experience as a national spending minister in previous legislative periods (previous 
years cabinet member) are decisive. With every additional year in office, the change of the 
debt to GDP ratio declines by approximately 0.26 percentage points (column 1). A similar 
result occurs for the years of former experience as cabinet member (decline of 0.21 
percentage points, column 2). This implies that either budget surpluses increase or the debt 
accumulation decreases the more experience a finance minister has gained in former positions 
or gains in office. Both impacts remain if other personal characteristics are included (column 
5 and column 8). Thus, a finance minister’s experience seems to be an additional determinant 
concerning the long term sustainability of public debt. 
With respect to the remaining measures of persuasiveness and experience, there is no 
empirical evidence supporting hypothesis 1b. Neither having fiscal policy experience (column 
4), nor being a cabinet member after recall (column 3) has a statistically significant impact on 
the development of public debt. This also applies to a finance minister’s life experience 
(age).8 The same holds true for hypothesis 2 and the hypothesis 3a. A finance minister’s 
ideological leaning or educational background has no significant impact on changes of a 
country’s CGD. 
Turning to the set of covariates, most of the control variables are highly significant and have 
an impact on public debt changes as expected. Automatic stabilisers work: A decline in 
unemployment and a higher growth of real GDP decrease the change of CGD. In addition, the 
inter-temporal budget constraint holds: Higher debt levels in the past reduce debt evolvement 
in the future. A rising population increases spending pressure and comes with a long term 
increase of the debt to GDP ratio. However, there is no empirical evidence concerning the 
existence of budget cycles (dummy variable election year) or with respect to government 
fragmentation. 
 
                                                 
8 To control for a non-linear relationship, in another version I have also included the first and the second 
polynomial of age. Both variables do not affect central government changes; the results are available upon 
request. 
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Table 4: Drivers of central government debt: Baseline specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CONTROL VARIABLES         
Unemployment rate 0.698*** 0.758*** 0.687*** 0.704*** 0.740*** 0.702*** 0.719*** 0.752*** 
 [4.736] [5.105] [4.739] [4.913] [4.683] [4.903] [4.922] [4.678] 
Lagged debt level -0.170*** -0.177*** -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.187*** -0.163*** -0.161*** -0.196*** 
 [-5.594] [-5.581] [-5.107] [-5.109] [-6.061] [-5.125] [-5.048] [-6.049] 
Real growth of GDP -0.293** -0.288** -0.331** -0.327** -0.261** -0.340** -0.316** -0.264* 
 [-2.203] [-2.283] [-2.562] [-2.530] [-1.987] [-2.602] [-2.341] [-1.966] 
Real long term interest rate 0.458*** 0.481*** 0.469*** 0.455*** 0.479*** 0.458*** 0.456*** 0.482*** 
 [2.997] [3.201] [3.095] [2.938] [3.139] [3.090] [2.999] [3.239] 
Population size 0.833* 0.624 0.553 0.693 0.710 0.645 0.682 0.691 
 [1.832] [1.303] [1.113] [1.432] [1.430] [1.368] [1.425] [1.380] 
Election dummy 0.399 0.350 0.360 0.350 0.409 0.336 0.350 0.410 
 [1.416] [1.237] [1.272] [1.242] [1.443] [1.199] [1.220] [1.432] 
Government fragmentation 0.00841 0.0105 0.0107 0.0109 0.00774 0.0163 0.0114 0.0118 
 [0.597] [0.778] [0.755] [0.775] [0.571] [1.030] [0.815] [0.794] 
Openness -0.00403 -0.00167 -0.00205 0.00491 -0.0110 0.0109 -0.00460 -0.00736 
 [-0.0872] [-0.0334] [-0.0422] [0.107] [-0.217] [0.233] [-0.0911] [-0.134] 
FINANCE MINISTER 
Age -0.00889 -0.00751 -0.0284 -0.0274 0.00417 -0.0287 -0.0205 0.00921 
 [-0.352] [-0.307] [-1.186] [-1.138] [0.173] [-1.177] [-0.826] [0.365] 
Years in office -0.259***    -0.247***   -0.242*** 
 [-3.087]    [-2.979]   [-2.764] 
Previous years cabinet member  -0.211**   -0.189**   -0.208** 
  [-2.298]   [-2.135]   [-2.064] 
Cabinet member after recall   -0.553  -0.246   -0.00320 
   [-1.070]  [-0.463]   [-0.00550] 
Fiscal policy experience    0.274 0.147   0.0525 
    [0.622] [0.353]   [0.124] 
Left ideology      0.632  0.592 
      [1.336]  [1.350] 
Economic education       0.427 0.540 
       [0.717] [0.848] 
Legal education       -0.135 0.275 
       [-0.257] [0.544] 
Unknown education       0.304 0.546 
       [0.272] [0.422] 
Constant -67.61* -51.76 -45.12 -56.95 -57.77 -53.52 -55.91 -57.21 
 [-1.864] [-1.359] [-1.136] [-1.482] [-1.456] [-1.424] [-1.462] [-1.434] 
Observations 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
R2 0.717 0.716 0.709 0.708 0.725 0.710 0.709 0.728 
Adjusted R2 0.658 0.656 0.648 0.647 0.663 0.649 0.645 0.663 
Cluster 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change of a country’s central government debt, measured in percentage points. The estimation method 
is OLS with country- and time-fixed effects. The t-statistics are given in brackets. A linear country-specific time trend is included in all 
estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level for each finance minister. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10(*), 5(**) 
and 1(***) percent level. Base category for the educational variables is “other education”. 
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As mentioned before, however, the finance minister is not a single player. Although his 
position differs from other spending ministers, the finance minister is still a member of the 
cabinet, which is headed by the prime minister. For this reason, the personal characteristics of 
the prime ministers could also have an impact on the development of public debt.9 To solve 
this omitted variable problem, I have included the personal characteristics of a country’s 
prime minister in the regressions. The data are coded in the same way as the finance minister 
data. To measure a prime minister’s experience, I use the years a prime minister has spent in 
office. The measure of this variable is identical to the measure of a finance minister’s office 
experience, i.e. the variable increases by one for every additional year the prime minister 
spends in office. To measure a prime minister’s ideology, I again use party affiliation as a 
proxy: The dummy variable left ideology (PM) is coded one if the prime minister is a member 
of a left-wing party (zero otherwise). Data for both variables are taken from DPI (Beck et al., 
2001). Data about the prime minister’s educational background are taken from Dreher et al. 
(2009) and extended to 2010. The authors provide dummy variables for seven different 
educational categories. To facilitate the comparison, the data are summarised into the four 
categories used before, i.e. the categories “natural science”, “political science”, “other 
university” and “not university” are pooled as other education (PM). 
The results are presented in Table 5. The structure of the table is similar to Table 4, i.e. in the 
first columns the separate impact of the personal variables is shown, whereas the joint impact 
of all variables is given in the last column. All estimations include the full set of macro-
economic, structural, and political control variables as discussed before. Concerning the 
results, neither the sign nor the significance level of the covariates changes. Due to space 
limitations, however, the covariates are not presented.10  
In each column, the analogous personal characteristics of the finance minister and the prime 
minister are included. As can be seen, the final results for the experience measures of finance 
ministers are not affected. Especially the deficit-reducing (or surplus-increasing) impact of the 
years the finance minister spends in office or has gained in former positions remains.  
                                                 
9 First evidence concerning this impact is given by Somogyi (2010), see the literature review. 
10 The results are available upon request. 
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Table 5: Drivers of central government debt: Additional controls (Prime Minister) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CONTROLS         
FINANCE MINISTER         
Age -0.00915 -0.00459 -0.0278 -0.0268 0.00480 -0.0297 -0.0220 0.00638 
 [-0.360] [-0.185] [-1.148] [-1.099] [0.198] [-1.201] [-0.894] [0.237] 
Years in office -0.251***    -0.227***   -0.207** 
 [-3.009]    [-2.768]   [-2.296] 
Previous years cabinet member  -0.234**   -0.204**   -0.217** 
  [-2.515]   [-2.262]   [-2.179] 
Cabinet member after recall   -0.573  -0.250   -0.0359 
   [-1.085]  [-0.466]   [-0.0598] 
Fiscal policy experience    0.283 0.147   0.0212 
    [0.642] [0.359]   [0.0532] 
Left ideology      0.874*  0.700 
      [1.757]  [1.502] 
Economic education       0.290 0.397 
       [0.491] [0.587] 
Legal education       -0.218 0.247 
       [-0.447] [0.478] 
Unknown education       -0.0711 0.469 
       [-0.0725] [0.377] 
PRIME MINISTER 
Years in office (PM) -0.0290 -0.100 -0.0700 -0.0678 -0.0636   -0.0725 
 [-0.430] [-1.388] [-0.997] [-0.961] [-0.890]   [-0.948] 
Left ideology (PM)      -0.579  -0.264 
      [-1.547]  [-0.738] 
Economic education (PM)       -0.154 -0.242 
       [-0.270] [-0.434] 
Legal education (PM)       -0.936 -0.853 
       [-1.479] [-1.350] 
Unknown education (PM)       -0.591 -0.905 
       [-0.570] [-1.020] 
Constant -66.83* -49.81 -43.69 -56.00 -55.59 -62.92 -56.71 -58.74 
 [-1.888] [-1.441] [-1.155] [-1.542] [-1.468] [-1.548] [-1.409] [-1.420] 
Observations 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
R2 0.717 0.718 0.711 0.709 0.726 0.712 0.713 0.732 
Adjusted R2 0.657 0.658 0.648 0.647 0.664 0.650 0.647 0.663 
Cluster 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change of a country’s central government debt, measured in percentage points. The estimation method 
is OLS with country- and time-fixed effects. The t-statistics are given in brackets. A linear country-specific time trend is included in all 
estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level for each finance minister. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10(*), 5(**) 
and 1(***) percent level. Base category for the educational variables is “other education”. The full set of macro-economic, structural and 
political control variables is included. The additional control variables “Prime minister” all refer the country’s prime minister; base category 
for the educational variables is “other education”. 
 
 
- 23 - 
 
Once again, a finance minister’s economic education has no significant impact on public debt 
changes. This also applies to the educational measures of the prime minister (column 7). This 
result, however, might be based on differences in economic teaching. A finance minister’s 
personal view on the role of public debt might also be influenced by the general economic 
mainstream at the time of graduation and the university’s leaning.11 To control for this issue, I 
have also estimated interaction terms of finance ministers who graduated in economics with 
dummy variables capturing young (age < 40 years) and old (age > 60 years) finance ministers 
or finance minister who were born before 1940 or after 1960. None of these interaction terms 
has any significant impact on public debt changes.12 
Finally, there is a marginally significant impact of a finance minister’s ideology (column 6), 
i.e. the change of public debt is positive if the finance minister is a member of a left-wing 
party which gives little support to hypothesis 3a. 
Taken together, especially hypothesis 1a on the impact of a finance minister’s experience is 
confirmed. Since selection issues are less severe concerning a finance minister’s previous 
experience as cabinet member (see Table 3), the results thus show that primarily finance 
ministers who have a sound understanding of the political game are able to retain their 
personal impact on policy decisions and have a long term debt-reducing impact. 
 
4.2 Interactions with institutions and economic development 
 
Hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5 are tested in Table 6 (institutions) and Table 7 (economic 
development). Both tables include the full set of control variables, finance minister 
characteristics, and prime minister characteristics. Due to space limitations, however, only a 
selection of variables is shown.13 Concerning the different impact of personal characteristics 
of finance ministers in different institutional environments, I have estimated various 
interaction terms with the dummy variable delegation approach. The variable is equal to one 
if the delegation approach is used and zero otherwise. The information about the implemented 
budgetary procedure per country stems from Hallerberg et al. (2009). Since I estimate a panel 
fixed model and the variable delegation approach is rarely changing or rather time-invariant, 
only the interaction terms can be interpreted correctly, whereas a valid interpretation of the 
single delegation dummy is not possible. The results of Table 6 reveal that the change of 
public debt is higher if the finance minister has gained previous experience as a national 
cabinet member and the delegation approach is used (column 2). This contradicts  
hypothesis 4; a finance minister’s political experience obviously pays off, especially if the 
finance minister’s institutional role is limited. The opposite holds true with respect to the 
                                                 
11 However, it was not possible to collect exact dates of graduation uniformly for all finance ministers. 
12 The results are not shown but are available upon request. 
13 The full tables are available upon request. 
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economic education of finance ministers (column 3). If the finance minister has studied 
economics and has a strong institutional role, the change of public debt is lower as compared 
to a finance minister with a limited scope of action.14 There is no empirical evidence 
concerning a finance minister’s experience in office.  
A further test now relates to another indicator about the strength of the finance minister. Like 
Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2010), I have coded a dummy variable indicating that the finance 
minister belongs to the same party as the prime minister (strong finance minister). However, 
contrary to their findings for the German subnational level, a combination of this measure of a 
finance minister’s strength with personal characteristics of finance ministers on the national 
level has no impact on public debt changes (see columns 4 to 6, Table 6).15 
 
The estimation results concerning hypothesis 5 are presented in Table 7. Again, all control 
variables, prime minister characteristics, and finance minister characteristics are included in 
the regressions. In the first three columns, interaction effects of finance minister 
characteristics and the real growth of GDP are estimated. In the next three columns, the same 
is done with the country’s unemployment rate. Only two interaction terms reveal a significant 
impact. However, the results concerning a finance minister’s experience in office contradict 
hypothesis 5: The decrease in the change of public debt combined with rising GDP growth is 
smaller if the minister has gained more experience in office. Finance ministers who serve for 
a long time are thus less engaged in budget consolidation in prosperous times as compared to 
finance ministers who are relatively new incumbents (column 1). The opposite effect occurs 
for unfavourable times: If the unemployment rate increases, the increase in the change of 
public debt is smaller the more experience a finance minister has gained in previous positions, 
i.e. the more political experience a finance minister has.  
Finally, I control for hypothesis 3b, i.e. the interplay of a finance minister’s ideology and 
election dates. The interaction term of both variables is positive but insignificant (column 7). 
There is no empirical evidence concerning a connection of a finance minister’s ideology and 
election dates. 
                                                 
14 Concerning a direct measure of the institutional strength of the finance minister, I have also used an index 
which stems from Hallerberg and Wolff (2008). However, there is no additional significant impact of these 
interaction terms. The results are available upon request. 
15 Jochimsen and Thomasius (2011) have also controlled for gender effects. However, only six female finance 
ministers are kept in the data in the regarded period, which results in too little information to control for gender 
effects. 
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Table 6: Drivers of central government debt: Interactions (institutions) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONTROLS       
PRIME MINISTER       
FINANCE MINISTER       
Years in office -0.236* -0.154* -0.228** -0.298** -0.203** -0.186* 
 [-1.782] [-1.699] [-2.457] [-2.167] [-2.111] [-1.896] 
Previous years cabinet member -0.216** -0.498*** -0.232** -0.206** -0.275* -0.229** 
 [-2.150] [-3.280] [-2.404] [-2.015] [-1.980] [-2.304] 
Economic education 0.433 0.405 1.447* 0.445 0.468 1.083 
 [0.650] [0.691] [1.791] [0.667] [0.703] [1.247] 
Delegation approach -1.296 -2.529** 0.666    
 [-0.856] [-2.029] [0.408]    
Delegation approach 0.0693      
   × years in office [0.401]      
Delegation approach  0.527***     
   × years cabinet member  [3.043]     
Delegation approach   -2.632***    
   × economic education   [-2.804]    
Strong finance minister    0.0365 0.206 0.844 
    [0.0563] [0.393] [1.272] 
Strong finance minister    0.126   
   × years in office    [0.778]   
Strong finance minister     0.0947  
   × years cabinet member     [0.543]  
Strong finance minister      -0.968 
   × economic education      [-1.174] 
Constant -54.05 -61.55 -52.72 -69.23* -61.16 -65.53 
 [-1.313] [-1.596] [-1.363] [-1.710] [-1.460] [-1.588] 
Observations 380 380 380 380 380 380 
R2 0.733 0.745 0.742 0.733 0.733 0.734 
Adjusted R2 0.662 0.676 0.673 0.662 0.662 0.663 
Cluster 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change of a country’s central government debt, measured in percentage points. The 
estimation method is OLS with country- and time-fixed effects. The t-statistics are given in brackets. A linear country-
specific time trend is included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level for each finance 
minister. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10(*), 5(**) and 1(***) percent level. Base category for the educational 
variables is “other education”. The full set of macro-economic, structural and political control variables, prime minister 
variables and finance minister variables is included. The additional control variables “Prime minister” all refer the country’s 
prime minister; base category for the educational variables is “other education”. 
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Table 7: Drivers of central government debt: Interactions (economic development) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CONTROLS        
PRIME MINISTER        
FINANCE MINISTER        
Real growth of GDP -0.394*** -0.228 -0.342** -0.264* -0.256* -0.269* -0.254* 
 [-2.754] [-1.510] [-2.253] [-1.928] [-1.904] [-1.964] [-1.873] 
Unemployment rate 0.748*** 0.773*** 0.787*** 0.755*** 0.906*** 0.854*** 0.778*** 
 [4.550] [4.683] [5.025] [4.495] [5.990] [4.438] [4.826] 
Election dummy 0.540* 0.454 0.445 0.472 0.394 0.432 0.0483 
 [1.841] [1.498] [1.482] [1.525] [1.295] [1.424] [0.101] 
Years in office -0.343*** -0.207** -0.212** -0.290* -0.227** -0.218** -0.214** 
 [-3.512] [-2.311] [-2.290] [-1.670] [-2.480] [-2.339] [-2.379] 
Previous years cabinet member -0.189* -0.180 -0.197* -0.220** 0.172 -0.226** -0.216** 
 [-1.937] [-1.506] [-1.963] [-2.172] [0.861] [-2.251] [-2.156] 
Economic education 0.429 0.382 -0.0679 0.428 0.269 1.337 0.394 
 [0.658] [0.565] [-0.0864] [0.622] [0.404] [1.134] [0.586] 
Left ideology 0.682 0.750 0.761* 0.688 0.940* 0.731 0.380 
 [1.511] [1.637] [1.736] [1.454] [1.966] [1.542] [0.729] 
Real growth of GDP 0.0587***       
   × years in office [4.499]       
Real growth of GDP  -0.0152      
   × years cabinet member  [-0.449]      
Real growth of GDP   0.188     
   × economic education   [0.934]     
Unemployment rate    0.0111    
   × years in office    [0.652]    
Unemployment rate     -0.0504**   
   × years cabinet member     [-2.356]   
Unemployment rate      -0.115  
   × economic education      [-0.826]  
Election dummy       0.896 
   × left ideology       [1.290] 
Constant -47.01 -57.68 -59.93 -58.63 -69.26* -50.61 -59.47 
 [-1.156] [-1.362] [-1.443] [-1.439] [-1.707] [-1.210] [-1.441] 
Observations 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
R2 0.743 0.733 0.734 0.733 0.739 0.733 0.734 
Adjusted R2 0.675 0.662 0.664 0.662 0.671 0.663 0.664 
Cluster 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change of a country’s central government debt, measured in percentage points. The 
estimation method is OLS with country- and time-fixed effects. The t-statistics are given in brackets. A linear country-
specific time trend is included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level for each finance 
minister. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10(*), 5(**) and 1(***) percent level. Base category for the educational 
variables is “other education”. The full set of macro-economic, structural and political control variables, prime minister 
variables and finance minister variables is included. The additional control variables “Prime minister” all refer the country’s 
prime minister; base category for the educational variables is “other education”. 
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4.3 Robustness checks 
 
Among others, tests concerning the sensitivity of the results refer to the selection of the 
finance ministers. Due to national elections, for instance, in some years more than one 
minister bears responsibility for public finance. To enable fixed-effects panel estimations, 
however, in these cases particular finance ministers must be excluded from the raw data. In 
the basic specification, only the finance minister who served longest in the respective year 
remains in the data. Changes of this algorithm might have an impact on the final results. I 
have controlled for this issue by using another algorithm which refers to the start of 
incumbency: If a finance minister was in office on January, 1, the respective year is 
completely ascribed to this minister. Consequently, all finance ministers who came to office 
later in the same year are excluded. The results are given in the appendix (Table A 4). Now, 
the measure of office experience misses statistical significance. The significant impact of the 
experience measure of previous years as cabinet member, by contrast, remains robust.  
Nonetheless, it is important to stress the disadvantage of this second algorithm: Only finance 
ministers who are appointed on January, 1 are included. The algorithm, however, does not 
control for the particular impact of the respective ministers. If a finance minister was voted 
out of office in March, his personal impact in the respective year should be very low or even 
non-existing. I therefore strongly prefer the first algorithm. 
Further tests concern the coding scheme of the experience measure years in office. In the 
basic specification, the measure increases by one if the finance minister has served for at least 
eight months. To control for the sensitivity of this measure, I have also employed thresholds 
of six and ten months (column 2 and column 3). Neither the sign nor the significance level of 
the measure of office experience changes.  
On top of that, the impact of finance minister characteristics might be biased since personal 
characteristics like previous cabinet experience or the educational variables of all finance 
ministers – regardless whether the finance minister has served for at least eight months or not 
– are included. For this reason, in another specification I have also excluded all finance 
ministers who have not served for at least eight months from the regression (column 4). 
Again, the significant impact of both experience measures remains. The same holds true if 
Luxembourg is excluded from the regression (column 5). This is done because of the long 
incumbency period of Jean-Claude Juncker. 
Finally, the impact of the economic education might be biased since I have pooled an 
educational background in economics with a graduation in business administration. For this 
reason, I have also estimated the separate impact of both fields of study. The results are 
presented in column 6. As compared to the remaining columns, the dummy variable economic 
education now solely captures a graduation in economics whereas the variable business 
administration equals one if the finance minister has graduated in business administration 
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(zero otherwise). However, the distinction in economics and business administration does not 
change the previous results.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper I extend the literature on the determinants of public debt by adding personal 
characteristics of national finance ministers for 15 European countries (1980 – 2010). In 
particular, I have included three different personal characteristics of national finance ministers 
which account for a finance minister’s experience, his educational background, and his 
ideological leaning. 
It turns out that especially a finance minister’s experience has an impact on the development 
of public debt (hypothesis 1a). Both a finance minister’s experience gained in office and his 
political experience are decisive. While the former experience measure suffers from potential 
endogeneity due to reverse causality, there are good arguments supporting that the latter result 
can be interpreted in a causal way. The more experience a finance minister has gained in 
previous positions as national spending minister in the cabinet, the smaller the change of the 
debt to GDP ratio. This implies that either budget deficits decrease or budget surpluses 
increase if the finance minister is a political heavyweight.  
The result is in line with the theory. The institutional function of the finance minister is to 
resist spending pressures of his cabinet colleagues. It is thus reasonable to assume that those 
ministers who have a sound understanding of the ways of political decision making have 
comparative advantages as compared to relatively inexperienced finance ministers. A finance 
minister who was a national cabinet member before becoming minister of finance has shown 
his ability to survive in politics. This demonstrates decisiveness and self-assertion which then 
also reflects in his new position as minister of finance. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE      
   Change of Central Gov. Debt 380 0.785 4.417 -9.869 19.070 
CONTROL VARIABLES      
   Unemployment rate 380 7.767 4.228 1.500 24.100 
   Lagged debt level 380 49.702 25.444 0.820 113.670 
   Real growth of GDP 380 2.411 2.539 -8.200 11.460 
   Real long term interest rate 380 3.980 2.292 -.3400 11.180 
   Population 380 25.518 26.181 0.403 82.534 
   Election year 380 0.300 0.458 0 1 
   Government fragmentation 380 30.166 24.336 0 74.709 
   Openness 380 80.70 47.371 35.330 324.360 
FINANCE MINISTER      
Experience      
   Years in office 380 3.218 3.015 0 20 
   Previous years cabinet member 380 2.031 2.673 0 10 
   Fiscal policy experience 380 0.526 0.499 0 1 
   Cabinet member after recall 380 0.337 0.473 0 1 
Education      
   Economic education 380 0.536 0.499 0 1 
   Law education 380 0.292 0.455 0 1 
   Other education 380 0.226 0.418 0 1 
   Unknown education 380 0.010 0.102 0 1 
Ideology      
   Left ideology 380 0.439 0.496 0 1 
PRIME MINISTER      
Experience      
   Office experience (PM) 380 4.226 3.194 1 16 
Education      
   Economic education (PM) 380 0.226 0.418 0 1 
   Law education (PM) 380 0.344 0.475 0 1 
   Other education (PM) 380 0.434 0.496 0 1 
   Unknown education (PM) 380 0.018 0.134 0 1 
Ideology      
   Left ideology (PM) 380 0.415 0.493 0 1 
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Table A2: Excluded ministers of finance 
Country Name Education Start Office End Office 
France Hervé Gaymard Law 30.11.2004 25.02.2005 
France Christian Sautter Unknown 02.11.1999 28.03.2000 
France Alain Madelin Law 18.05.1995 25.08.1995 
France Jean-Louis Borloo Economics/Law 18.05.2007 19.06.2007 
Germany Oskar Lafontaine Other 27.10.1998 18.03.1999 
Greece Georgios Agapitos Economics 13.02.1990 11.04.1990 
Greece Agamemnon Drettakis Unknown 28.06.1982 05.07.1982 
Greece Ioannis Pottakis Unknown 09.09.1983 27.03.1984 
Greece Antonis Samaras Economics 02.07.1989 12.10.1989 
Greece Georgios Souflias Other 23.11.1989 13.02.1990 
Greece Georgios Gennimatas Other 13.10.1993 25.02.1994 
Ireland Gene FitzGerald Unknown 16.12.1980 30.06.1981 
Ireland Charles Haughey Law 07.11.1991 14.11.1991 
Italy Silvio Berlusconi Law 04.07.2004 16.07.2004 
Netherlands Gijsbert Michiel V. van Aardenne Other 22.02.1980 04.03.1980 
Netherlands Johannes Franciscus Hoogervorst Economics 22.07.2002 27.05.2003 
Portugal António Bagão Félix Economics 17.07.2004 12.03.2005 
Portugal Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins Law 03.07.2001 06.04.2002 
Portugal Luís Campos e Cunha Economics 12.03.2005 21.07.2005 
Sweden Odd Engström Unknown 16.02.1990 27.02.1990 
Notes: Summary of finance ministers per country who are excluded from the regressions. A finance minister 
was excluded if there was one or more changes of incumbency per year and if the finance minister has not 
served the longest as compared to the remaining ministers in the respective year. 
 
 
Table A3: Included Time Series (Baseline regression) 
Country 
Included Period Number of  
Observations 
Number of  
Finance Ministers Start End 
Austria 1981 2009 29 9 
Denmark 1981 2009 29 10 
Finland 1991 2009 19 5 
France 1993 2009 17 8 
Germany 1981 2009 29 6 
Greece 1998 2009 12 4 
Ireland 1982 2009 28 10 
Italy 1981 2009 29 11 
Luxembourg 1994 2009 16 1 
Netherlands 1981 2009 29 5 
Norway 1981 2009 29 10 
Portugal 1983 2009 27 9 
Spain 1981 2009 29 7 
Sweden 1981 2009 29 9 
United Kingdom 1981 2009 29 7 
Sample 1981 2009 380 111 
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Table A4: Drivers of central government debt: Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONTROLS       
FINANCE MINISTER       
Age -0.00213 0.00489 0.00722 0.00235 0.00561 0.00658 
 [-0.0717] [0.181] [0.270] [0.0803] [0.219] [0.243] 
Years in office -0.127 -0.179** -0.219** -0.182* -0.223** -0.207** 
 [-1.384] [-2.058] [-2.513] [-1.748] [-2.548] [-2.281] 
Previous years cabinet member -0.185* -0.222** -0.214** -0.211* -0.214** -0.219** 
 [-1.862] [-2.207] [-2.166] [-1.961] [-2.158] [-2.132] 
Cabinet member after recall -0.397 -0.0707 -0.0488 -0.289 -0.181 -0.0346 
 [-0.638] [-0.117] [-0.0817] [-0.453] [-0.314] [-0.0572] 
Fiscal policy experience -0.290 0.00141 -0.00970 -0.0413 -0.0624 0.0119 
 [-0.678] [0.00349] [-0.0244] [-0.0983] [-0.164] [0.0299] 
Left ideology 0.493 0.745 0.700 0.608 0.630 0.704 
 [0.948] [1.587] [1.517] [1.233] [1.417] [1.479] 
Economic education 0.454 0.390 0.440 0.591 0.532 0.421 
 [0.722] [0.571] [0.651] [0.836] [0.821] [0.568] 
Business administration      0.357 
      [0.473] 
Legal education 0.801 0.266 0.273 0.501 0.196 0.252 
 [1.367] [0.515] [0.530] [0.923] [0.385] [0.478] 
Unknown education 0.185 0.410 0.464 0.820 0.675 0.496 
 [0.161] [0.331] [0.381] [0.575] [0.544] [0.384] 
PRIME MINISTER       
Years in office (PM) -0.0946 -0.0783 -0.0725 -0.111 -0.0810 -0.0722 
 [-1.378] [-1.022] [-0.951] [-1.445] [-1.008] [-0.936] 
Left ideology (PM) -0.260 -0.269 -0.219 -0.364 -0.259 -0.272 
 [-0.574] [-0.745] [-0.612] [-0.836] [-0.743] [-0.724] 
Economic education (PM) 0.0774 -0.197 -0.235 0.0883 -0.227 -0.246 
 [0.123] [-0.351] [-0.429] [0.146] [-0.415] [-0.434] 
Legal education (PM) -0.839 -0.839 -0.864 -1.063 -0.944 -0.851 
 [-1.337] [-1.307] [-1.394] [-1.408] [-1.514] [-1.340] 
Unknown education (PM) -0.847 -0.886 -0.891 -1.205 -0.965 -0.911 
 [-0.886] [-1.011] [-1.002] [-1.045] [-1.025] [-1.025] 
Constant -41.11 -55.93 -55.71 -1.952 7.263 -58.72 
 [-1.038] [-1.366] [-1.363] [-0.353] [1.415] [-1.417] 
Start January, 1       
Years in office: 6 months       
Years in office: 10 months       
Years in office: 8 months       
FM tenure < 8 months excluded       
Luxembourg excluded       
Observations 380 380 380 346 364 380 
R2 0.725 0.731 0.733 0.753 0.748 0.732 
Adjusted R2 0.654 0.662 0.664 0.681 0.681 0.662 
Cluster 114 111 111 110 110 111 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change of a country’s central government debt, measured in percentage points. The 
estimation method is OLS with country- and time-fixed effects. The t-statistics are given in brackets. A linear country-
specific time trend is included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level for each finance 
minister. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10(*), 5(**) and 1(***) percent level. Base category for the educational 
variables is “other education”. The full set of macro-economic, structural and political control variables is included; the 
results of these control variables are given in the appendix. The additional control variables “Prime minister” all refer to the 
country’s prime minister; base category for the educational variables is “other education”. In column 6, the dummy variable 
economic education solely captures a graduation in economics whereas the variable business administration equals one if the 
finance minister has graduated in business administration. 
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Table A5: Variable Description 
Variable Description Source 
∆CGD Change of central government debt in percent of national GDP (given in 
percentage points). 
OECD, 
Jaimovich and 
Panizza (2006) 
Unemployment 
rate 
Ratio of number of persons unemployed and the number of persons in 
the labor force (percent). 
The unemployment rate as defined above is not (or only partially) 
available for France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands or Portugal. 
For these countries, the harmonised unemployment rate (unemployed 
persons as a percentage of the civilian labour force) is used (percent). 
OECD 
Lagged debt level Lagged level of central government debt in percent of GDP (percent). OECD 
Real growth  
of GDP 
Growth rate of real GDP (percent). OECD 
Real long term 
interest rate 
Real long term interest rate based on Fisher equation: Long term interest 
rate – inflation rate (percent). 
Own computation 
based on OECD 
Population Population (per million inhabitants). OECD 
Government 
fragmentation 
Government fragmentation: “The probability that two deputies picked at 
random from among the government parties will be of different parties” 
(percent), Beck et al. (2001). 
DPI 
Openness Sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP, all measured in US $, 
constant prices, constant PPPs, (percent). 
Heston et al. 
(2011) 
Election year Dummy variable = 1 if there was a legislative or executive election in 
this year (zero otherwise). 
DPI 
Years in office Experience of the minister of finance measured as the time in office as 
finance minister: plus one if the minister has served for at least eight 
months (years). 
Various sources 
Previous years 
cabinet member 
Experience, measured in years, a finance minister has gained as a 
national cabinet member before appointment as national finance minister 
 
Various sources 
Cabinet member 
after recall 
Dummy variable = 1 if the finance minister was member of the cabinet 
after his dismissal from office (zero otherwise). 
Various sources 
Fiscal policy 
experience 
Dummy variable = 1 if the finance minister has had any kind of practical 
experience in the field of fiscal policy (zero otherwise). 
Various sources 
Economic  
education 
Dummy variable = 1 if the minister of finance has either an economical 
background or an educational background in business administration 
(zero otherwise). 
Various sources 
Law education Dummy variable = 1 if the minister of finance has legal educational 
background (zero otherwise). 
Various sources 
Other education Dummy variable = 1 if the minister of finance has known but other than 
legal or economical educational background (zero otherwise). 
Various sources 
Unknown  
education 
Dummy variable = 1 if the educational background of the minister of 
finance is unknown (zero otherwise). 
Various sources 
Left ideology Dummy variable = 1 if the minister of finance is a member of a left 
oriented party.  
Tsebelis (2002) 
Office  
experience (PM) 
Experience of the prime minister measured as the time in office: plus 
one if the chief executive officer was in office on January, 1 or was 
elected, but had not taken office as of January, 1 (years). 
DPI 
Economic  
education (PM) 
Dummy variable = 1 if the prime minister has either an economical 
background or educational background in business administration  
(zero otherwise). 
Dreher et al. 
(2009) 
Law  
education (PM) 
Dummy variable = 1 if the prime minister has legal educational 
background (zero otherwise). 
Dreher et al. 
(2009) 
Other  
education (PM) 
Dummy variable = 1 if the prime minister has known but other than legal 
or economical educational background  
  
Dreher et al. 
(2009) 
Unknown  
education (PM) 
Dummy variable = 1 if the educational background of prime minister is 
unknown (zero otherwise). 
Dreher et al. 
(2009) 
Left 
ideology (PM) 
Dummy variable = 1 if the prime minister is a member of a left oriented 
party. 
DPI 
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